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Abstract COVID-19 has given rise to malicious content online, including
online abuse and hate toward British MPs. In order to understand and con-
textualise the level of abuse MPs receive, we consider how ministers use social
media to communicate about the crisis, and the citizen engagement that this
generates. The focus of the paper is on a large-scale, mixed methods study
of abusive and antagonistic responses to UK politicians during the pandemic
from early February to late May 2020. We find that pressing subjects such as
financial concerns attract high levels of engagement, but not necessarily abu-
sive dialogue. Rather, criticising authorities appears to attract higher levels of
abuse. In particular, those who carry the flame for subjects like racism and
inequality, may be accused of virtue signalling or receive higher abuse levels
due to the topics they are required by their role to address. This work con-
tributes to the wider understanding of abusive language online, in particular
that which is directed at public officials.
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1 Introduction
Social media can offer a “temperature check” on which topics and issues are
trending for certain cross-sections of the public, and how they feel about
them [17]. This temperature has run high during the COVID-19 pandemic,
with a number of incendiary and misleading claims [12], as well as hate-
ful and abusive content [59] appearing online. This content can interfere
with both government and public responses to the pandemic.
A recent survey of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs in England, for example,
demonstrated that belief in conspiracy was associated with lower compli-
ance with government guidelines. Moreover, the authors found that 1 in 5 of
their participants had a strong endorsement of conspiracy thinking [21],
indicating that this is not just a fringe issue. Online verbal abuse contributes
as well, being both cause and consequence of misinformation: the quality of
information and debate is damaged as certain voices are silenced/driven out
of the space,1 and escalation leads to angry and aggressive expressions [52].
Understanding the interplay between malicious online content and the pub-
lic’s relationships with authorities during a health crisis is necessary for an
effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
1.1 Scope
This work charts Twitter abuse in replies to UK MPs from before the
start of the pandemic in the UK, in early February, until late May
2020, in order to plot the health of relationships of UK citizens with their
elected representatives through the unprecedented challenges of the COVID-
19 pandemic. We consider reactions to different individuals and members of
different political parties, and how they interact with events relating to the
virus. We review the dominant hashtags on Twitter as the country moves
through different phases, as well as some dominant conspiracy theories.
For these data, we show trends in abuse levels, for MPs overall as well
as for particular individuals and for parties. We also compare prevalence
of conspiracy theories, and contextualise them against other popular top-
ics/concerns on Twitter. In addition to our quantitative analysis, we present
an in-depth qualitative analysis on tweets receiving more than 20 abusive
replies, that constitute 8% or more of total replies that tweet received.
We use a set of qualitative codes derived from the literature on how au-
thorities make use of social media during crisis (and health crisis in particular).
Referring to this as the social media activities of the MP who authored a
tweet, we are able to label each tweet according to its most probable agenda
(e.g. reaching out to constituents, communicating official information). This
allows us to see the distribution of media activities across different parties and
genders, for example. We then developed inductive codes for the COVID-19
topic and potential controversial subject of the tweet (e.g. communicating
1 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50246969
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policy about COVID-19 or making criticisms of COVID-related policy and
Brexit or Inequality, respectively), and noted any attached URLs or images
for reference. We also listed the abusive words found in each reply to the tweet.
Finally, we prepared an analysis of those labels by gender, party, sexual ori-
entation and ethnicity. In our analysis, we consider how social dimensions
of antagonistic political discourse in the UK (ideology, political author-
ity and affect), which have been visible in other recent key moments (such
as Brexit and successive general elections), influence the civility of discourse
during COVID-19.
1.2 Contribution
This study aims to answer the following research questions:
1. How has the context of COVID-19 impacted the typical patterns that have
been observed in previous work about hateful and abusive language toward
UK MPs?
2. How do the social dimensions that have impacted political discourse on
Brexit and successive general elections appear to impact how social media
activities are perceived during the COVID-19 pandemic?
3. Which social media activities of UK MPs during the COVID-19 pandemic
receive the most abusive replies? How can we contextualise these results?
The contribution of this study is to understand both the content and con-
text of abusive and hateful communication, particularly toward gov-
ernments and authorities during a health crisis. Our focus, UK MPs,
adds to a growing longitudinal body of work that analyses online abuse at
many key moments in British politics from 2015 to the present [29,23,5,66].
In the sections below, we begin with a description of the current context
and a brief summary of related work. We then outline our methodology in
detail before progressing onto findings. Finally, we summarise and conclude
our manuscript with some suggestions for future work.
2 Context of COVID-19
The dangers and perceived risks of COVID-19 have fluctuated during the pan-
demic as a result of emerging knowledge. This feature of the pandemic creates
an environment of uncertainty and ambivalence that feeds malicious
content on social media.
Early epidemiological studies of COVID-19 [37,67] implicated certain risk
factors, such as age, gender and pre-existing conditions may impact transmis-
sion and severity of illness. As the pandemic progressed, researchers began to
understand more about asymptomatic transmission [3,44,14], discovering
that there may be many more cases of COVID-19 than once realised. This
4 Tracie Farrell et al.
led some researchers to suggest that the morbidity rate of COVID-19 is lower
than initially presumed [19], though this data is difficult to calculate2.
However, some communities were discovered to be at a greater risk. Re-
search on health care professionals who contracted COVID-19, for exam-
ple, indicated that the most seriously ill individuals had multiple exposures
to the virus, primarily at work [9], as well as longer duration of (sometimes
unprotected) exposure to the virus [31]. As more information emerged about
disproportionate cases of COVID-19 and poor health outcomes in Black and
Asian communities in England, researchers began to also investigate early
warning signs that some social or ethnic communities were more
vulnerable than others [34,45]. This too, has led to challenging debates
about social welfare, racism and healthcare during the pandemic.
Tensions between competing political and social interests during times of
uncertainly can lead to an increase in hateful and antagonistic discourse online.
Valasquez et al found that malicious content of various kinds including
misinformation, disinformation and hate speech are proliferating on-
line about COVID-19. Looking at clusters of online communities, the au-
thors found that existing antagonistic groups appeared to mobilise COVID-19
to spread hate and malicious content even into mainstream communities [59].
3 Related Work
Organisations use social media during crisis events to correct rumours, pre-
vent crisis escalation, provide facts or information, transmit proactive-
ness toward resolving the situation, and to communicate directly with
members of the public (without temporal or geographic constraints) [16].
Not using social media to address a crisis can incur reputational damage for
the organisation [13].3
Twitter and other forms of social media are popular tools used by organisa-
tions and governments to communicate with citizens during crisis events [47].
The focus for the literature below is to briefly review how governments and
authorities use such tools to communicate about health crises, particularly in
the UK, and to explore how malicious content and abuse has been examined
previously within this context.
3.1 Public Use of Social Media in a Health Crisis
Before we address how politicians use social media in a health crisis, it is worth
examining perspectives of the public and what they expect from politicians
when emergencies like COVID-19 arise. Evidence indicates that the public ex-
pect a swift, transparent response from the government to crisis [6,
47]. The public may also wish to engage with the government on its response.
2 https://ourworldindata.org/mortality-risk-covid
3 https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/
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The greater the political interest of the user, the more likely they are to per-
ceive and take advantage of the ‘‘connective affordances” that social media
provides for politicians and their constituents to engage [33]. Third, and per-
haps most importantly, during a health crisis, most citizens will be interested
in government advice and support [58,39]. For example, Vos and Buckner
examined Tweets that were shared during H7N9 “Bird Flu” health crisis, and
found that the majority of messages were about “collective sense-making
responses” under conditions of uncertainty, rather than “efficacy re-
sponses” offering specific advice or information that would help the public to
respond appropriately [61]. A similar pattern was observed in response to the
2016 Zika virus outbreak, with individuals using social media to form a per-
sonal risk assessment [30]. Llewellyn et al [39] found that the public seeks
advice from experts and that the informal character of online communication
can interfere with the public’s ability to form good opinions about
the expertise of individuals online, even public figures. If sense-making and
risk-assessment are the top public tasks for which they seek information on
social media, government messages that do not respond to this need may miss
the mark.
3.2 Politicians’ Social Media Use in a Health Crisis
In their analysis of political communication on social media, Stieglitz and
Dang-Xuan [55] show that politicians may use social media for communi-
cation and persuasion, to “meet” voters and engage them in discus-
sion, and also to communicate policy or other important information
to their constituents. Political analysis of US congress members on Twitter
shows that self-promotion is also an activity in which politicians engage, us-
ing the opportunity to share personal information or stories, and present
themselves and their platforms in a good light [22]. However, this is not
always true. Studies from the Swedish electoral context showed that Swedish
politicians did not use Twitter to engage with voters, but rather to provide
information to them [36]. In the UK, because internal party campaigns are
based on individual candidates, politicians in the UK share some media be-
haviours with their counterparts in the US, where individual voter appeal is
critical to campaign success [38].
3.2.1 Dimensions of Political Discourse in the UK
The COVID-19 pandemic is a novel political situation in which ministers
must respond to the crisis, while continuing to function in their roles. Though
the situation may be new, the dialogue around COVID-19 is influenced by
existing social and political dimensions of British political discourse.
In their work documenting positions around the European Referendum,
Andreouli et al named three dimensions for understanding the emergent dia-
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logue around Brexit [1], that we feel may be useful here. These are “political
values, political authority, and the authority of affect”.
With regard to values, the authors reflect on how existing ideological
themes impact how an issue is perceived and discussed, in particular, where
classical dichotomies do not hold up. For example, while the left typically
associates itself with anti-prejudice and tolerance, associating such qualities
with voting to “remain” is inconsistent with other leftist ideas to be anti-
establishment. The authors argue that this tension creates a “liminal hotspot”
where cosmopolitanism and critiques of globalisation intersect.
We propose this same step, in light of the current crisis, to understand the
dominant political and social themes that influence abuse toward UK MPS
during COVID-19. We are already seeing evidence of potential areas of tension
in the current pandemic, such as the needs of older4 and younger people
5, the reliance on science and perception of risk [8,21], the division
between the wealthy and the poor [63], and the experiences of the urban
and rural [32,41].
Second, Andreouli et al [1] discuss the notion of political authority, and
how the sovereignty of the UK within the EU becomes a backdrop for discourse
on immigration during the European Referendum. During the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the sovereignty of local governments within the UK has been
a consistent feature of debate, whether it involved avoiding beauty spots in
Wales during lockdown6, comparing Scotland’s success in handling the virus7,
or the differential impact on the economy in Northern Ireland.8 Media reports
during the peak of the outbreak also indicated resistance toward lockdown,910,
or wearing face-coverings1112. As we move toward the next phases of the crisis,
conflicts about personal agency and choice that may play out at individual or
group levels in how the public respond to government guidance.
Finally, Andreouli et al [1] discuss the role of affect in political discourse.
They demonstrate how impassioned speech has become its own kind of
credibility, in which the narrative, rather than being factual, is important. In
September 2019, parties signed a pledge to use moderate language after a series
of heated and antagonistic debates in which Boris Johnson was criticised for
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-COVID-19-support-for-
care-homes/coronavirus-COVID-19-care-home-support-package
5 https://www.ukyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/UK-Youth-COVID-19-
Impact-Report-External-Final-08.04.20.pdf
6 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-52614204
7 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-53195166
8 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-53386976
9 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/may/14/police-vow-to-break-up-
planned-anti-lockdown-protests-in-uk-cities
10 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/20/coronavirus-world-erupts-protest-
against-lockdown-pictures/
11 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/face-masks-coronavirus-
uk/2020/07/14/d05dfb7c-c5d4-11ea-a825-8722004e4150 story.html
12 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/06/britains-hubristic-scientific-advisers-
wrong-public-should-wearing/
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framing the Brexit conversation as “surrender” to the European Union, and
for invoking the name of British MP Jo Cox, who was murdered by a far-right
extremist one week before the referendum.13 Dawn Butler, who called the
Prime Minister reckless in his decision to send employees back to work, was
accused of using hyperbolic language in describing how such a policy amounted
to sending people to work to catch the virus14. Due to her vocal support of
#blacklivesmatter, Butler has now had to shut down her offices in response to
racism, death threats and other threats of violence.15
One of the goals of this research is to analyse topics of discussion and
responses within these three dimensions (see Section 6). This will allow us
to contextualise the public’s antagonistic responses to UK MPs on Twitter
during COVID-19 thus far.
3.2.2 Hate and Abuse of British MPs Online
As the conversation around online abuse develops, we need to differentiate
the hostility that arises from increased visibility and engagement,
from that which is based on hate or hate-speech toward a specific group
of individuals or communities [50].
In the UK, where legal frameworks tend to evolve, hate speech was defined
through several legal statues, including The Public Order Act of 1986. 16 Legal
philosopher Jeremy Waldron [62] has. argued, however, that hate speech is
that which sends a message to undervalued groups of communities
that they are not welcome or wanted. It also sends a message to other
sympathisers who may devalue or feel solidarity with that community. In
particular, hate speech is associated with power [46].
Governments and politicians communicate hateful messages, for example,
through language about Romani people in Europe [51] or Mexican and other
Latin immigrants in the United States [10,35]. Governments have contributed
to hate through politicising tribal identity in sub-Saharan countries like Kenya
and Rwanda [53,20], and how they shape debates about free speech [48] or
migration [57] more generally. Politicians, therefore, can both be the
targets of hate (as members of protected groups) and the perpetra-
tors (as public authorities whose words matter). Governments can also
antagonise the public. In the context of COVID-19, the ways in which politi-
cians are communicating about potentially volatile issues, such as re-opening
the economy or avoiding social protest, add to the overall “health” of the
discourse, or diminish it.
13 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/30/westminster-parties-sign- pledge-
to-use-moderate-language
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49833804
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37978582
14 https://www.kilburntimes.co.uk/news/coronavirus-dawn-butler-mp-calls-boris-
johnson-reckless-1-6651422
15 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-53346803
16 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/contents
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There is a considerable amount of historical data on the prevalence of online
abuse directed at British MPs, particularly on Twitter. Previous work [29,23,
5,66] has shown rising levels of hostility towards UK politicians on Twitter,
particularly in the context of divisive issues, such as Brexit or inequality.
Partisan operators have been implicated in fanning the flames with malicious
content, such as misinformation or troll accounts [26].
In their 2017 and 2020 papers, Ward and McLoughlin examined online
abuse received by British MPs from November 14, 2016 - January 28, 2017
[43,65]. The major findings from this work were that the amount of online
hate (rather than language that can be described as “abusive” or
uncivil) is relatively low and, as such, men receive more online abuse than
women. The authors also showed that increased name recognition and
popularity have a positive relationship with levels of abuse. Crucially, how-
ever, the authors note that women and those from a minority back-
ground are more likely to receive abusive replies that can be classified as
hate speech. Abuse toward specific parties was difficult to distinguish, as lev-
els of abuse may be influenced by one party member who attracts a significant
proportion of abuse. When controlling for this, the authors found that less
visible MPs had a very small percentage of hate and abuse. This means that
women MPs with visibility disproportionately attract hate speech, as do men
with visibility other forms of abusive language. This work prompted questions
about what visibility means for people of different genders and back-
grounds. Southern and Harmer [54] conducted a deeper content analysis on
tweets received by MPs during a period and found that while men received
more incivility in terms of numbers of replies, women were more likely to re-
ceive an uncivil reply. Women were more likely to be stereotyped by identity
(men by party) and to be questioned in their position as an MP.
Gorrell et al [25] extended this work to define four visibility factors that
appear to influence the amount of abuse the UK MPs receive online:
– Prominence: Individuals in the public eye will receive more abuse;
– Event surges: Events leads to spikes in abuse (such as participation in an
event, or political activities);
– Engagement: Expressing strong opinions on social media can result in more
personal abuse;
– Identity: Gender, ethnicity and other personal factors impact which opin-
ions one is allowed to hold and express without receiving abuse.
Gorrell et al also note that the impacts or consequences of abusive language
are not manifesting in the same ways for male and female MPs, or MPs with
intersectional identities of race and gender. Where some abuse is distressing,
other abuse is personal, threatening and limits women’s participation in the
public office [23,15,49].
From this review, a picture emerges of the precipitating activities, me-
diating factors and dimensions of online abuse toward UK MPs during
COVID-19, which can be interrogated through our large-scale study.
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Time period Original Retweet Reply ReplyTo Abusive % Abuse
Total 107,209 187,586 56,706 4,726,070 179,493 3.798
Table 1 Corpus statistics. Columns give number of original tweets authored by MPs, num-
ber of retweets authored by them, number of replies written by them, number of replies
received by them, number of abusive replies received by them, and abusive replies received
as a percentage of all replies received.
4 Methodology
In this work we apply a combination of computational and social science meth-
ods to evaluate abuse toward UK MPs on Twitter. We utilise a large tweet
collection on which natural language processing analysis has been performed in
order to identify abusive language. This methodology is presented in detail by
Gorrell et al [23] and summarised here. We then follow Braun and Clarke’s [7]
process of thematic analysis on a subset of tweets that received 8% or more of
abusive replies, in which at least 20 abusive replies were received. This analysis
is described in more detail below.
4.1 Corpus
The corpus was created by collecting tweets in real-time using Twitter’s stream-
ing API. We used the API to follow the accounts of UK MPs - this means we
collected all the tweets sent by each current MP, any replies to those tweets,
and any retweets either made by the MP or of the MP’s own tweets. Note
that this approach does not collect all tweets which an individual would see in
their timeline, as it does not include those in which they are just mentioned.
However, “direct replies” are included. We took this approach as the analysis
results are more reliable due to the fact that replies are directed at the politi-
cian who authored the tweet, and thus, any abusive language is more likely to
be directed at them. Data were of a low enough volume not to be constrained
by Twitter rate limits.
The study spans February 7th until May 25th 2020 inclusive, and discusses
Twitter replies to currently serving MPs that have active Twitter accounts
(574 MPs in total). Table 1 gives the overall statistics for the corpus.
4.2 Rule-based Identification of Abusive Language
A rule-based approach was used to detect abusive language. An extensive
vocabulary list of slurs (e.g. “idiot”), offensive words such as the “f” word
and potentially sensitive identity markers, such as “lesbian” or “Muslim”,
forms the basis of the approach. The slur list contained 1081 abusive terms or
short phrases in British and American English, comprising mostly an exten-
sive collection of insults, racist and homophobic slurs, as well as terms that
denigrate a person’s appearance or intelligence, gathered from sources that
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include http://hatebase.org and Farrell et al [18]. 131 offensive words were
used, along with 451 sensitive words. “Bleeped” versions such as “f**k” are
also included.
On top of these word lists, 53 rules are layered, specifying how they may
be combined to form an abusive utterance as described above, and including
further specifications such as how to mark quoted abuse, how to type abuse as
sexist or racist, including more complex cases such as “stupid Jew hater” and
what phrases to veto, for example “polish a turd” and “witch hunt”. Making
the approach more precise as to target (whether the abuse is aimed at the
politician being replied to or some third party) was achieved by rules based
on pronoun co-occurrence. Where people make a lot of derogatory comments
about a third party in their replies to a politician however, for example racist
remarks about others, there may be targeting errors leading to false positives.
The abuse detection method underestimates by possibly as much as a factor
of two, finding more obvious verbal abuse, but missing linguistically subtler
examples. This is useful for comparative findings, tracking abuse trends, and
for approximation of actual abuse levels.
The method for detecting COVID-19-related tweets is based on a list of
related terms. This means that tweets that are implicitly about the epidemic
but use no explicit COVID terms, for example, “@BorisJohnson you need to
act now,” are not flagged.
4.3 Thematic Analysis
To understand more about the kinds of tweets attracting high levels of abuse,
we considered several approaches for ranking them. Ranking tweets by the
most replies will surface prominent individuals, but perhaps not always polar-
ising individuals or viewpoints. We decided on an initial criterion that a tweet
had to have received 8% or more abusive replies, which is nearly twice
the average level of abuse noted by [66,29,24]. In addition, to filter out tweets
that were attracting just a handful of abusive replies, we examined tweets that
received at least 20 abusive replies.
All tweets were first examined and coded openly, as suggested by Braun
and Clarke [7], to see which patterns emerge. Contentious subjects (such as
Brexit, racism, and even Jeremy Corbyn), as well as potential media agen-
das (such as reaching out to undervalued communities, or making criticisms
of the party in government) emerged from this analysis. We then compared
open codes to themes from the literature regarding social media activities
that politicians may undertake during a health crisis, as well as ideological
themes and existing priors that may be influencing how UK MPs are per-
ceived. We created a final set of categories through the processes of reduction
and comparison across the codes. We then re-coded the data according to the
final annotation scheme in Table 2.
In addition to these codes, we also examined the topics MPs referred to
in their posts and grouped them inductively into categories of topics that are
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Media
Category
No.
Tweets
Description Examples
Defending 14 MPs responding to cri-
tiques of oneself or oth-
ers
Replying to Keir Starmer: A low blow
and misjudged at this time. Yes we
need everyone to have PPE but the
right use of It is also needed. - Stuart
Anderson
Defending
(e)
3 Similar to the above,
but with “escalation
indicators” (described
below)
For God’s sake. The man nearly died.
He is going to Chequers away from the
glare of publicity to recuperate and be
with his partner who is due to give
birth in a matter of weeks. Get a life -
idiot keyboard warrior! #HardHearted
- Andrea Jenkyns
Direct Re-
buke
3 MPs critiquing some-
one who is not directly
an authority
No celebrations today. Only relief that
the disastrous Corbyn era is over and
hope that we can turn the page on
what it did to Labour. Congratula-
tions to (Kier Starmer) and (Angela
Rayner) on their elections as Leader
and Deputy Leader. - Pat McFadden
Direct Re-
buke (e)
3 Similar to the above,
but with escalation in-
dicators
Not that I should be surprised by the
lazy left but interesting how work-shy
socialist and nationalist MPs tried to
keep the remote Parliament going be-
yond 2 June. - Henry Smith
Direct Re-
buke of Au-
thorities
60 MPs critiquing people
in power, in particu-
lar coming from oppo-
sition parties
It is irresponsible and short-sighted
from the government to rule out ex-
tending the post-Brexit transition pe-
riod. We should be taking action now
to provide certainty for business in the
face of this global economic challenge.
- Lisa Nandy
Direct
Rebuke of
Authorities
(e)
70 Similar to the above,
but with escalation in-
dicators
Boris Johnson boasting about shaking
hands with coronavirus patients. You
could not make it up. Britain is about
to learn the hard way this is not the
man to lead us in a crisis. - David
Lammy
Engage
Voters
47 MPs reaching out to
potential new voters
and speaking to core
voters
If there’s one clip to watch from
#Brits2020 last night, it’s this. (San-
tan Dave) speaking truth to power.
Hero - Zarah Sultana
Escalation 9 MPs making state-
ments that just agitate
How many Johnson children are there
now? - Barry Sheerman
Events 12 The MP’s tweet relates
back to an event that
preceded the Tweet or
a clear pattern of be-
haviour
NEWS: My Telegraph article on the
next stage of our #coronavirus plan:
We must all do everything in our power
to protect lives. - Matt Hancock
Information 4 MPs providing infor-
mation without com-
mentary
Data sources and maps here: - Richard
Burgon
Proactive 24 MPs relating a sense of
doing something about
the problem
Dear @patel4witham please do the
right thing and release the women in
Yarlswood now. - Jess Phillips
Unclear 4 Tweet could not be an-
notated or belongs to
no clear category
Quite the change in rhetoric from the
days when Welsh Government were en-
couraging people to come to Wales
and drive their 4x4’s right onto the
beaches. - Stephen Crabb
Grand
Total
190
Table 2 Media Categories that express MPs’ activities on Twitter, to which the MP re-
ceived abusive replies. Descriptions and examples included.
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considered controversial in UK politics. These were: home rule/nationalism
with respect to Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales; inequality; and
Brexit, alongside specific individuals and the ways in which they
communicate. Of course, the topic of COVID-19 itself - the government
response and the impacts- was a primary topic category as well. Following
the distribution of these codes and topics in our sample, we used descriptive
statistics and further qualitative analysis to expand on trends and observations
uncovered through our computational approaches.
In consideration of rigour, we have taken several steps to adjust for having
used one annotator for the qualitative analysis. Barbour has suggested focus-
ing on alternative explanations in analysis, rather than a potentially superficial
measure of inter-rater agreement through multiple coders [4]. In addition, we
provide a full justification of the coding scheme against each tweet in the sam-
ple, available at the URL noted in Section 9, so that other researchers can
interrogate and interpret our findings accordingly.
In the following section, we present our findings, which are organised by
research question and which include both the quantitative and qualitative data
analysis that answer that particular research question.
For RQ1, we rely primarily on our literature review of trends and high-level
analysis of abuse toward British MPs. We compare this with our findings from
the COVID-19 period we studied. For RQ2, we consider how our findings fit the
dimensions noted by Andreouli et al [1] as impacting contemporary British po-
litical discourse: ideology, authority and affect. We explore the four factors
that contribute to how these dimensions are perceived, such as prominence,
specific events, engagement habits and features of identity [25]. Finally, for
RQ3, we present our qualitative analysis on the social media activities of UK
MPs during COVID-19 thus far. We contextualise the abusive responses they
receive for these activities, given the dimensions and contributing factors that
may play a role.
5 Findings: General Trends and Comparisons (RQ1)
Our first research question asked: How has the context of COVID-19 impacted
the typical patterns that have been observed in previous work about hateful and
abusive language toward UK MPs? To answer this question, we begin with a
review of the time period studied, namely February 7th until May 25th 2020
inclusive, placing it in historical context.
Gorrell et al [28] use the same (cautious) abuse counting methodology as
we use here to show that aside from a blip around the 2015 general election,
abuse toward MPs on Twitter has been tending to rise from a minimum of
2% of replies in 2015, peaking mid-2019 at over 5% with a smaller peak of
around 4.5% around the 2019 general election. After the election, however,
abuse toward MPs fell to around 3.5%.
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Fig. 1 Abuse percentage received by all MPs, macro- (red) and micro- (blue) average, per
week
Fig. 2 Abusive replies as a percentage of all replies received, micro-average, split by party
and time period.
In the timeline in Fig 1 we zoom in on the study period, and show abuse
levels overall, toward all MPs, on a per-week basis since mid-February. This
timeline shows a rise in abuse, back up to over 4% around the time of the
introduction of social distancing, before dipping, and then gradually beginning
to rise again later in the study period. We see that the macro-average abuse
level (red line) remains relatively steady, suggesting that this fluctuation is
confined to a small number of high profile politicians (therefore being more
evident in the micro-averaged blue line).
Fig 2 shows abuse received as a percentage of all replies received by MPs,
for six distinct time periods discussed in more detail below. We see that on the
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whole, response to the Conservative party has been favourable. The exception
is after May 10th, when the negative response to Dominic Cummings’ decision
to travel north with COVID-19 symptoms came to the fore. Responses to
Liberal Democrat MPs are more erratic due to their lower number. In previous
studies, we have found Conservatives receiving higher abuse levels, yet here
we see Labour politicians receiving more abuse in most periods. This was in
evidence even in February, so precedes the pandemic, although Twitter has
tended to be left-leaning in the UK [27]. It remains to be seen if this is the
beginning of a swing to the right or if it is specific to the times, e.g. arising
from a desire to trust authority during times of crisis [60].
There is a significant negative correlation between receiving a high level of
COVID-related attention and receiving abuse (-0.52, p<0.001, Feb 7th to May
25th, Spearman’s PMCC). We see this clearly in prominent government figures
below, who are receiving the lion’s share of the COVID-19 attention and lower
levels of abuse than seen for them in pre-COVID periods [29,25]. However
the correlation is significant across the sample of all MPs. The reaction of the
public to the Conservative party and the government’s actions during COVID-
19 may be related to the conditions of a public health crisis as discussed in [58,
39], in which citizens may feel more motivated to trust authorities, although
it may also follow from the crisis engaging a different group of people than
usually respond to politicians on Twitter.
With a view to separating out different groups of Twitter users, we tracked
hashtags relating to dominant pro- vs anti-lockdown perspectives, as well as
issues of concern; namely conspiracies and misinformation, and racism in con-
junction with the pandemic. Pro- and anti-lockdown hashtags were easily ac-
quired, being dominant hashtags appearing in the dataset. They were then
extended with minor linguistic variants. This report17 from Moonshot CVE
was used as a guide to the overall conspiracy landscape within COVID-19.
They provide some hashtags, and variants were then acquired, again, from
looking down the list of hashtags appearing in the dataset for other variants,
and including linguistic variations. The areas they highlight are anti-Chinese
feeling/conspiracy theory, theories that link the virus to a Jewish plot, theo-
ries that link the virus to an American plot, generic “deep state” and 5g-based
theories and general theories that the virus is a plot or hoax. Table 3 shows
substantial evidence of ill-feeling toward China.
In our analysis, MPs using Chinese data or referencing the Chinese govern-
ment’s response to COVID-19 in a positive context appear to attract abuse.
One example, in terms of receiving a high percentage of abuse as well as a
notable degree of attention, was the one below from Richard Burgon.
https://twitter.com/RichardBurgon/status/1244043022297370626 (17%
abuse, or 6% of all abuse sent to MPs in March post-lockdown):
This is a Trump-style attempt to divert blame from the UK govern-
ment’s failures.
17 http://moonshotcve.com/COVID-19-conspiracy-theories-hate-speech-twitter/
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Search terms (in all replies to MPs, not case-sensitive) # tweets # abusive % abusive
“#endthelockdown” 5,506 272 4.940
“#newstarterfurlough” OR “#newstarterjustice” 55,593 243 0.437
“#stayhomesavelives” 20,538 1222 5.950
“#coronahoax” OR “#hoaxvirus” OR “#fakevirus” 415 61 14.699
“#coronabollocks” 250 19 7.600
“#plandemic” OR “#scamdemic” OR “#fakepandemic” 1,178 64 5.433
“#filmyourhospital” OR “#emptyhospitals” 59 5 8.475
“#ccpvirus” OR “#chinaliedpeopledied” 2,463 38 1.543
“#chinesevirus” 2,208 119 5.389
“#NukeChina” OR “#DeathtoChina” OR “#DestroyChina” 31 2 6.452
“#GatesVirus” OR “#CIAVirus” OR “#AmericaVirus” 69 2 2.899
“#5gcoronavirus” 53 1 1.877
Table 3 Mention count of viewpoint-related hashtags, in all replies to MPs, Feb 7th to May
25th inclusive. Some further variants of the terms given, including non-hashtag mentions
in text, are also included but not listed here for brevity; see Gorrell et al [28] for a more
complete description
A World Health Organization report says China “rolled out perhaps
the most ambitious, agile & aggressive disease containment effort in
history”
We haven’t even sorted out enough tests for NHS staff
China’s record of human rights or transparency is often provided as evi-
dence of argument against such tweets. However, mixed in with this are also
a number of Sinophobic comments about China having “caused” or “started”
the virus, for which at present there is no reliable scientific evidence. It is
not clear how potentially useful critiques of the Chinese government may be
discussed without also provoking more sinister, racist commentary.
Classic conspiracy theories are in evidence but numbers of mentions are low
(though note that most of the 183 mentions of “NWO” (“new world order”)
are now COVID-19-related, suggesting opportunistic incorporation of COVID-
19 into existing mythologies). There is considerable evidence of some Twitter
users not believing in the virus, and numbers of mentions to this effect are
within one order of magnitude of the popular “stay home save lives”. Yet all
are surpassed by the theme of economic support for those not in established
employment (”#newstarterfurlough”).
So across the board, COVID-19 has not led to higher proportions
of abuse on Twitter for MPs compared with the high levels of abuse
directed at them in 2019. However, these findings might be partially ex-
plained by varying degrees of engagement by different societal groups,
in addition to events affecting attitudes to authority. As we will see in
Section 6.1, the comparatively positive response to Boris Johnson might be
explained by more people replying to him than would normally do so; this ex-
tra attention was not abusive. The lower levels of abuse received by MPs who
receive more tweets mentioning COVID-19 might also be explained by differ-
ent people replying to politicians than usually would. A particularly
striking illustration of this comes from tweets to MPs using the hashtag #new-
starterfurlough and variants. People who had recently started a new job ”fell
through the cracks” for financial support from the government. With 56,000
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tweets to MPs using #newstarterfurlough and variants (compared with only
21,000 using #stayhomesavelives and variants), #newstarterfurlough is the
dominant hashtag campaign of the period. Given that those individuals are in
an unfortunate position, it is all the more surprising to find that only 0.4% of
those tweets contained abuse, as shown in Table 3. A possible explanation is
that the “new starters” are a broader, and more polite, cross-section of
society than people who usually reply to politicians on Twitter.
In contrast, tweets containing #stayhomesavelives and variants contained
6.0% abuse. Tweets containing hashtags refuting the very existence of the
virus, for example #scamdemic and #hoaxvirus, contained 7.8% abuse. Tweets
describing COVID-19 as ”Chinese”, e.g. containing #chinesevirus, contained
5.4%. Tweets found containing anti-lockdown hashtags contained 4.9% abuse.
6 Dimensions of Political Discourse During COVID-19 (RQ2)
Our second research question asked what are the societal dimensions that ap-
pear to impact how media activities are perceived during the COVID-19 pan-
demic and how does this compare with those that impacted Brexit or recent
general elections?. For this question, we drew on previous work described in
section 3, more specifically in 3.2.2 on levels of abuse toward UK MPs. We
then examined the time period covered by our study in the context of three di-
mensions drawn from Andreouli et al [1]: political authority, ideology and
affect. We use the 4 factors from Gorrell et al [25] to help further describe
these dimensions in terms of: prominence, event surges, engagement and
identity.
6.1 Political Authority
As mentioned previously, Brexit created a notion of political authority that
presented sovereignty of the UK on one side or community with Europe on
the other [1]. During the past three UK elections, partisanship has led to
a splintering of political authority and an erosion of trust [26]. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, we can see a similar effect, for example, the wearing of
face-coverings as a personal versus social choice18, and participation in protest
versus public health.19
Increased name recognition and popularity have also been associated with
higher levels of abuse in both the cases of Brexit and General Elections [43,
65,29,25]. Our COVID-19 data shows similar trends.
Fig 3 shows number of replies to prominent politicians since early Febru-
ary, and shows that for the most part, attention during COVID-19 has
18 https://www.southwalesargus.co.uk/news/18444799.wearing-face-covering-mask-wales-
not-compulsory/
19 https://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/2020/06/19/risking-their-lives-to-save-their-
lives-why-public-health-experts-support-black-lives-matter-protests/#11b5ac96851b
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Fig. 3 Number of replies received by relevant ministers and opposition leader Keir Starmer
per day from February 7th to May 25th 2020 inclusive.
focused on Boris Johnson. He received a large peak in Twitter attention
on March 27th. 58,286 replies were received in response to his tweet announc-
ing that he had COVID-19. Abuse was found in 2.3% of these replies. This is
low for a prominent minister as we may discern from Fig 1, indicating a
generally supportive response to the prime minister’s illness. Further peaks on
Mr Johnson’s timeline correspond to the dates on which he was admitted to
intensive care (April 6th), left hospital to recuperate at Chequers (April 12th),
and began to ease the lockdown (May 10th). The late burst of attention on
other politicians arises from several tweets by ministers in support of Dominic
Cummings, the senior government advisor who chose to travel north to his
parents’ home in the early stages of his illness with COVID-19.
However, one tweet receiving a high level of abuse regarded the very first
video address made by Boris Johnson in response to the pandemic:
https://twitter.com/BorisJohnson/status/1238365263764041728 (9%
of replies were abusive, tweet received 3% of all abuse to MPs in the period.
It also includes a video statement.)
This country will get through this epidemic, just as it has got through
many tougher experiences before.
For those who trust in Boris Johnson’s leadership and who like the way
he communicates, this tweet may have provided some comfort. A review of
replies to this tweet shows that supporters tweeted messages of appreciation
and hope in response. For those who do not trust him and who believe he
should have acted sooner, this tweet was perceived as a provocation. Several
replies that are critical but not abusive point to official sources of information
from elsewhere in Europe, or make advisement to the public about staying
home and avoiding non-essential journeys.
In this sense, COVID-19 lends its own political authority to some
arguments. However, invoking COVID-19 as a member of the opposition, es-
pecially in the context of persistent debates, is often met with accusations of
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“playing party politics”. The following tweet by David Lammy received
16% abusive replies, representing 1% of all abuse sent to MPs in the March
pre-lockdown period:
https://twitter.com/DavidLammy/status/1239835712444391424
No more government time, energy or resources should be wasted on
Brexit this year. Boris Johnson must ask for an extension to the tran-
sition period immediately. #COVID19 is a global emergency.
Several MPs made comments about the need to extend the Brexit transi-
tion period. All received a considerable amount of replies containing abusive
language.
More generally, there is disagreement about the priorities of govern-
ment during a crisis. For example, there was a considerable amount of
abuse directed at Richard Burgon for a tweet in which he discussed the ac-
complishments of his work as shadow justice secretary.20 This was regarded
by some critics as mistimed, given the PM’s health at the time, and received
17% abuse, constituting 2% of all abuse sent to MPs between April 1st and
16th inclusive.
In later sections, we will explore how the media activities of opposi-
tion parties are perceived by the public, in particular in connection with
contentious subjects.
6.2 Events
Events are somewhat in a category of their own, as an MP’s past actions
and words become part of the public’s priors in understanding the position
of that MP. To contextualise the level of attention to MPs and the abusive
replies they received in connection with specific events, we review the events
of the period, both in terms of who is receiving abusive replies and in the
themes that are rising during the period as demonstrated by the appearance
of certain hashtags.
6.2.1 Beginning of the Pandemic
The hashtag cloud in Fig 4 shows that Brexit remained the dominant topic in
Twitter political discourse during February, with the epidemic not yet having
arrived in the UK.
Table 4 gives a baseline for attention on MPs as we go into the pan-
demic, showing that aside from Boris Johnson, attention, and abuse, is high
for Labour politicians. The column Authored refers to the number of tweets
originally posted from that account that were not retweets or replies. “re-
plyTo”, refers to all of the replies received to the individuals Twitter account
in that period. The next column, “COV”, is the number of replies received
20 https://twitter.com/RichardBurgon/status/1247248198932062208
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Fig. 4 Top 100 hashtags in all replies sent to MPs - February 7-29 2020 inclusive.
Name Authored replyTo COV Abusive % Ab % COV % Total COV
Boris Johnson 14 48,379 1,072 1,695 3.504 2.216 37.773
David Lammy 89 47,368 73 2,308 4.872 0.154 2.572
Richard Burgon 184 30,789 18 1,556 5.054 0.058 0.634
Jeremy Corbyn 25 29,550 215 2,400 8.122 0.728 7.576
Rebecca Long-Bailey 121 27,113 17 823 3.035 0.063 0.599
Zarah Sultana 96 18,630 12 677 3.634 0.064 0.423
Debbie Abrahams 96 18,186 45 822 4.520 0.247 1.586
Keir Starmer 97 15,455 26 360 2.329 0.168 0.916
Lisa Nandy 110 15,271 9 413 2.704 0.059 0.317
Priti Patel 9 13,664 45 345 2.525 0.329 1.586
Table 4 MPs with greatest number of replies from February 7 - 29 2020 inclusive. Cell
colours indicate party membership; blue for Conservative, red for Labour.
Name Authored replyTo COV Abusive % Ab % COV % Total COV
Boris Johnson 45 160,356 28,818 7,684 4.792 17.971 49.380
David Lammy 120 43,386 1,602 2,952 6.804 3.692 2.745
Matthew Hancock 100 42,520 7,167 1,800 4.233 16.856 12.281
Jeremy Corbyn 44 42,435 1,824 3,244 7.645 4.298 3.125
Rishi Sunak 47 25,534 2,225 284 1.112 8.714 3.813
Nadine Dorries 52 24,731 1,275 466 1.884 5.155 2.185
Jess Phillips 154 20,931 394 541 2.585 1.882 0.675
Lisa Nandy 74 20,355 234 925 4.544 1.150 0.401
Richard Burgon 145 20,281 446 1,222 6.025 2.199 0.764
Zarah Sultana 107 18,796 204 815 4.336 1.085 0.350
Table 5 MPs with greatest number of replies from from March 1st - 22nd 2020 inclusive.
Cell colours indicate party membership; blue for Conservative, red for Labour, yellow for
Liberal Democrat.
to that account containing an explicit mention of COVID-19, with the follow-
ing column representing the number of replies that verbal abuse was found
in (“Abusive”). The last three columns present the data in a comparative
fashion. Firstly, we have the percentage of replies that the individual received
that were abusive. Next, we have the percentage of replies that were COVID-
related. The last column is the percentage of COVID-related replies to that
individual, in comparison with all COVID-related replies received by all MPs.
The word cloud in Fig 5 shows all hashtags in tweets to MPs in earlier part
of March, and unsurprisingly shows a complete topic shift, to the subject of
the epidemic, to the virtual exclusion of all else.
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Fig. 5 Top 100 hashtags in all replies sent to MPs - March 1st - 22nd 2020 inclusive.
We see from Table 5 that with the arrival of COVID-19 in the UK, Health
secretary Matt Hancock became more prominent on Twitter at this time,
though attention was not more abusive. Attention on chancellor Rishi Sunak
also increased and was not abusive. This is consistent with previous research
that indicates a public willingness and desire to trust authorities in a crisis [58,
39]. We see a high level of attention on Boris Johnson, but the abuse level is
lower than was seen for him in previous years (we found 8.39% in the first half
of 2019 as mentioned above; in 2017 as foreign secretary Mr Johnson received
similarly high abuse levels in high volumes). Negative attention on Labour
politicians is high, but note that this was also the case before the start of the
epidemic in the UK.
Matt Hancock received 11% abusive replies (3% of all abuse to MPs in the
March pre-lockdown period) to the following tweet, in which he released his
Telegraph article on the government’s response to the virus.
https://twitter.com/MattHancock/status/1238960146342084609
NEWS: My Telegraph article on the next stage of our #coronavirus
plan: <link>
We must all do everything in our power to protect lives
Critics were angry that Mr. Hancock would post important government
information, during a time of extreme uncertainty, behind a pay wall. This
goes back to the public’s information-seeking needs during a health crisis [58,
39]. Not only is information important for collective sense-making, it is also
important for determining personal risk [61].
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6.2.2 Beginning of Lockdown
With the commencement of lockdown, the rise of the hashtags “#stayhome-
savelives” and #lockdownuknow shows a shift toward comment on the prac-
tical details. Support for the lockdown appears to be high at this stage, with
the top ten hashtags featuring only pro-lockdown or generic COVID-19 tags.
Attention continues to focus on Boris Johnson (see Gorrell et al [28] for com-
plete word clouds and tables as well as histograms for each period), and is
even less abusive than previously, largely due to a surge in non-abusive at-
tention in conjunction with his being diagnosed with COVID-19. By volume,
the most abuse-generating tweet was Boris Johnson’s illness announcement,
but as a percentage this was remarkably un-abusive, as discussed above, with
only 2.3% abuse. The high abuse count follows only from the very high level
of attention this tweet drew.
Moving into April 2020, the rise of the hashtag “#newstarterfurlough”
shows that prior to Donald Trump’s “liberation” tweets and the visible emer-
gence of an anti-lockdown backlash, attention has already begun to focus on
the economic cost of the lockdown, as illustrated by the prominence of hashtags
such as #newstarterfurlough and #wearethetaxpayers.
Boris Johnson’s abuse level continues to be low as his illness takes a serious
turn. In the context of the pandemic, different influences from the public also
have a measure of authority. For example, the high abuse level toward Jack
Lopresti during this period relates to his controversial opinion that churches
should open for Easter. Strong opinion in conjunction with a religious event
is part of a pattern that we see in conjunction with Eid in the next section.
https://twitter.com/JackLopresti/status/1247508135029411841 (18%
abuse, 6% of all abuse sent to MPs between April 1st and 16th inclusive):
Open the churches for Easter and give people hope https: // telegraph.
co. uk/ news/ 2020/ 04/ 06/ open-churches-easter-give-people-hope/
?WT. mc_ id= tmg_ share_ tw via @telegraphnews
https://twitter.com/JackLopresti/status/1247894726486798342 (17%
abuse, 3% of all abuse sent to MPs between April 1st and 16th inclusive):
Today I wrote to The Secretary of State @mhclg and also sent a copy
of this letter to Secretary of State @DCMS to ask the Government to
consider opening church doors on Easter Sunday for private prayer.
6.2.3 Lockdown Backlash
From mid-April 2020, a notable backlash against lockdown began to emerge.
Hashtags now appear to be critical, often economically focused but also in-
cluding accusations of lying against China, Boris Johnson and Conservatives,
and references to the shortage of personal protective equipment for medical
workers. The distinct change in tone echoes events in the USA.21
21 E.g. https://www.theguardian.com/global/video/2020/apr/16/
armed-protesters-demand-an-end-to-michigans-coronavirus-lockdown-orders-video
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In this context it is interesting therefore that the tweet receiving the most
abusive response by volume (it also received a striking level of abuse by per-
centage) is this one by Ed Davey.
https://twitter.com/EdwardJDavey/status/1253882262715842560 (19%
abuse, 5% of all abuse toward MPs for the period):
A pre-dawn meal today
Preparing for my first ever fast in the holy month of Ramadan
For Muslims doing Ramadan in isolation, you are not alone!
#RamadanMubarak
#LibDemIftar
The following tweet also attracted high levels of abuse by volume:
https://twitter.com/jeremycorbyn/status/1253341601599852544 :
Ramadan Mubarak to all Muslims in Islington North, all across the UK
and all over the world.
This tweet received 11% abusive replies, 2% of abuse for the period - this
was also St George’s Day, so perceived as evidence of anti-English sentiment, as
in the following paraphrased replies for example: “@jeremycorbyn So nothing
about St George’s day then? Ah, that’s because we are English, the country
you wanted to run but hate with a vengeance. And you wonder why you
suffered such a huge defeat at the election” and “@jeremycorbyn So no mention
of St. George’s day then? You utter cretin.”
These attempts to reach voters and how they are perceived by those not
within the same ideological framework will be discussed in Section 6.
6.2.4 Lifting of Restrictions
As lockdown begins to be eased in May 2020, we see a return to a high level
of focus on Boris Johnson, with 194,000 replies compared to Matt Hancock’s
124,000 as the next most replied-to MP. Other senior Conservatives are also
prominent. High levels of abuse are received by ministers who defended Do-
minic Cummings’ actions on Twitter; Matthew Hancock (6.37%), Oliver Dow-
den (8.17%) and Michael Gove (7.13%). Boris Johnson also receives more abuse
than he did in the previous period (4.92%). Example tweets are given below
of ministers defending Mr Cummings:22
https://twitter.com/MattHancock/status/1264162359733555202 (7%
abuse, 7% of abuse for the period):
I know how ill coronavirus makes you. It was entirely right for Dom
Cummings to find childcare for his toddler, when both he and his wife
were getting ill.
22 More tweets by ministers defending Mr Cummings:
https://twitter.com/OliverDowden/status/1264221876374646786
https://twitter.com/michaelgove/status/1264126108733186050
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https://twitter.com/MattHancock/status/1264975804208947208 (9%
abuse, 4% of abuse for the period):
Dom Cummings was right today to set out in full detail how he made
his decisions in very difficult circumstances. Now we must move on,
fight this dreadful disease and get our country back on her feet
Hashtags show a high degree of negative attention focused on the partial
treatment of Dominic Cummings, whilst continued attention on the economic
plight of new starters is also in evidence. This signals the beginnings of con-
tention that blossom in the periods after this study was concluded.
6.3 Ideology
The ideologies that influenced Brexit, such as anti-prejudice and tolerance [1]
are still apparent in the context of COVID-19. “Virtue signalling” is a
common complaint attached to nearly every tweet that addresses issues of
inequality and some that are trying to engage voters (see Section 7). Virtue
signalling is defined as behaviour that indicates support for causes or senti-
ments that carry moral value, such as donating to charity [64], without much
actual effort or care for the topic behind it. Disagreement on what constitutes
virtue signalling versus actually caring about a social issue creates a “liminal
hotspot” where misunderstanding takes place [1]. We go more deeply into the
subject of virtue signalling in Section 6.
In many cases, identity and ideology are interrelated through ex-
perience. Individuals from minority backgrounds speak about racism more
often, also in context of COVID-19, potentially because they experience it.
When MPs from under-valued or under-represented minorities speak to their
voters about racism, they are not only speaking to voters who need to un-
derstand experiences of racism, but also to voters who experience it directly.
If the MP has a track record in working toward racial justice, their election
is a signal that they should keep doing this work. Of the 15 tweets shared
by Women of Colour in our qualitative sample (190 Tweets receiving a high
percentage and number of abusive replies), more than 50% are about engaging
voters and being proactive toward issues of inequality (we see this in more de-
tail in 7.3 and in Table 9). Another 40% are direct rebukes of authority from
women in opposition parties. It seems that Women of Colour are dispropor-
tionately carrying the flame for the highly abused topic of inequality, as we
see in Fig 9. This may have partly to do with the party they belong to, but
it appears to be also partly about the topics and expertise these women bring
to the table. For example, Bell Ribeiro-Addy was elected for the first time in
December 2019 after a long career of addressing inequality in migration. She
addresses Sinophobia in communications about coronavirus and its origins in
this Tweet:
https://twitter.com/BellRibeiroAddy/status/1247570145733758980
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As senior Conservatives publish Sinophobic screeds in the rw press
to distract from their own Governments lethal complacency, its clear
racism wont stop for #Coronavirus. Neither must we opposing it. Join
the fightback in an hour! http://ow.ly/4GBm30qw1jX
This quote communicates proactiveness, for example, with the words ”op-
pose” or ”fightback”. As such, this is the kind of statement that is not meant
for those who don’t accept racism as a fact of experience, or who do not think
it is an important issue in the context of COVID-19. It is a call to action for
those who do.
This tweet, from MP Rupa Huq, addresses the lack of women ministers
present at press briefings:
https://twitter.com/RupaHuq/status/1246107696652320769
Once again headed up by a man for the umpteenth time - who we only
heard a week ago had tested #COVID19 positive to boot. When will
Downing Street allow a woman minister to front up one of these press
shindigs?
Several responses to this tweet ask why the MP chooses to focus on gender,
given that the roles most relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic just happen
to be held by men. Or, they ask her to explain why she believes a woman could
do a better job. Some responses also refer to this as “virtue signalling”, though
the MP is a woman and her comment is about representation of women.
In terms of the General Elections in 2015 and 2017, topics of concern were
primarily around the economy, Europe and the NHS. While Europe and Brexit
are still present as important subjects, our topic analysis and the hashtags
collected in each period show that the economy is now the greatest concern for
users on Twitter, along with various implications for public health, survival of
businesses, unemployment, and social welfare. The significant financial support
the government has provided during COVID-19 has revived discussions about
socialism and capitalism more generally as economic models:
https://twitter.com/jeremycorbyn/status/1238897340309790721
There’s no statutory sick pay for part-time, low-paid or zero-hours con-
tract workers. And the rate of sick pay isn’t enough to live on. Wrong
at any time - but dangerous while people who might be ill are asked to
stay home. The system is broken and now is the time to fix it.
This quote from Jeremy Corbyn attracted supportive messages, including
some that are abusive toward Boris Johnson or other members of the Con-
servative party. However, there were also many criticisms of the tweet, which
primarily express exasperation with Mr. Corbyn or chastise him for bringing
this subject up in the middle of a crisis. If one agrees with Mr. Corbyn and feels
that this crisis has only further exemplified the failings of the social welfare
system in the United Kingdom, his words will resonate.
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6.4 Affect
Previous work has suggested that impassioned speech provides a measure of
credibility on its own. MPs have been asked to consider the tone of their
messages to the public and to one another in Parliament [16]. However, in
COVID-19, in which the country is embroiled in a large public health crisis,
it is difficult to determine exactly how tone impacts the political discourse.
When we were looking for escalations in our qualitative sample, we looked at
critiques of MPs’ tweets to try and understand what someone might object
to in a given statement. Typically, hyperbolic language, sarcasm, insult, and
making something personal are the escalations that are named. However, to
avoid potentially classifying a tweet as escalating for using strong language
around events that are urgent matters of public health, we required at least
two measures of escalation to be present in order to classify a tweet as a
potential escalation. When examining our sample, escalations were present in
about a quarter of the tweets.
As a percentage of replies, a notable tweet was the following:
https://twitter.com/HenrySmithUK/status/1263394101002674176 (13%
abuse, 2% of abuse for the period of May):
Not that I should be surprised by the lazy left but interesting how work-
shy socialist and nationalist MPs tried to keep the remote Parliament
going beyond 2 June.
In the context of an increasingly uncertain economic situation for many
individuals, respondents felt that Mr. Smith was accusing those who have
been furloughed or who are shielding of avoiding work. Several respondents
also implied that work in communities to provide social support was not being
valued. Though Mr. Smith’s comments (and his affect) may have been directed
at his colleagues in Parliament, he hit a mark with left-leaning members of
the British public as well.
Many other tweets (n=60) are about rebuking authorities, which is some-
times done using strong language. We have 14 tweets from David Lammy in
the sample, which is more than 7% of the sample. A portion of these tweets
include some sort of escalation indicator, such as hyperbole, sarcasm, or per-
sonal insults that critics tend to pick up on in their replies (see example in
Table 2. Once again, this definition of ”escalation” was defined by those who
criticised the tweets. In order to understand this further, we extended our
analysis to look more deeply at the specific subject matter being discussed.
The subjects Mr. Lammy is discussing are urgent and controversial in British
political discourse, such as racism, Brexit and more personally, the leadership
of Boris Johnson. It is not clear whether or not he is targeted because of his
communication style (as critics say), his party membership, or because of his
ethnic background.
Affect and race are connected in how much anger and frustration those from
a minority background are expected to express by a predominantly White so-
ciety [2]. The stereotypes of the “angry Black woman” (or man) persist, in
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particular with connection to the topic of racism or inequality more generally.
It has only been 33 years this past June that Black MPs have been elected
to Parliament (https://labourlist.org/2020/06/watch-labour-celebrates-33rd-
anniversary-of-first-black-mps-elected/). For this reason, it is worth consider-
ing how speech is understood through that lens.
7 Findings: Social Media Activities During COVID-19 (RQ3)
Our third research question asked: Which social media activities of UK MPs
during the COVID-19 pandemic receive the most abusive replies? To answer
this question, we applied our coding scheme described in 4.3 to a sample of
tweets that received a substantial number of replies that contained abusive
language (see section 1). The purpose of this was to identify qualitative dif-
ferences in authors, content, or delivery that may help explain the negative
discourse related to their tweets and highlight any other social factors at play.
In total, we identified 190 tweets meeting these criteria.
66 MPs authored the 190 tweets that received the highest number and
percentages of abusive replies. 17 MPs are women, which is approximately
35% of the sample. Women make up approximately 30% of UK Parliament. 23
However, of the 17 women, 41% are Women of Colour (n=7), though Women
of Colour only make up a small percentage of an already small percentage MPs
from a “minority” background. 24 It is important to note that none of these
women are members of the Conservative party. In fact, Labour politicians
have authored 108 of the 190 Tweets in this sample. Conservatives authored
53, Liberal Democrats 16, the Scottish National Party 11 and the Democratic
Unionists 2. To break this down further, we had 4 Conservative MPs who are
female (all white), and 25 male MPs. For the Labour Party, that split is more
even, with 11 women and 14 men. Table 6 gives corpus statistics in terms of
tweets authored. ”Tweets” is number of tweets authored, ”% of corp” is the
percentage of the qualitative corpus that number constitutes, and ”% Repr.” is
the representation that demographic has among MPs with Twitter accounts for
comparison. ”# Replies” is the number of replies tweets by that demographic
in the qualitative corpus received, and ”# Abusive” is the number of those
replies that were abusive (recall that the tweet is only included if it receives a
high level of abuse).
7.1 Social Media Activities: Subjectivity in Escalation and Virtue
Examining each tweet, we had 11 categories of social media activities, plus
one additional “unclear” media category (see Table 2). We added a modifier
to the media activity of “escalation”, if there were combinations of what we
23 http://www.ukpolitical.info/female-members-of-parliament.htm
24 https://theconversation.com/black-british-citizens-want-more-than-complacency-from-
this-government-140297
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Demographic Tweets % of corp % Repr. # Replies # Abusive
White men 348 72.63 60.63 257,960 28,263
Men of colour 25 10.53 4.36 28,727 2,938
Women of colour 32 7.89 5.57 30,999 3,198
White women 169 8.95 29.44 33,435 3,391
Table 6 Proportion of the qualitative corpus (most abused tweets) authored by different
demographics, alongside representation of that demographic among MPs on Twitter for
comparison, the number of replies and the number of abusive replies received by those
tweets.
referred to as the five indicators of escalation: the presence of hyperbole
(language that is perceived as having high valence), sarcasm or flippancy,
insult and abusive language, making something personal (criticising the
individual rather than their actions) or solidifying “us and them” narratives.
These escalation indicators were derived from how critics and abusers of the
tweets in our sample speak about escalating language and what they think
is antagonistic. If a tweet only contained escalation indicators and no other
content, it was categorised as “escalation” only. Examples of each category
are provided in Table 2 and the full qualitative sample and coding notes are
provided at the URL given in Section 9.
Escalations were particularly subjective and therefore difficult to classify.
However, only 22 tweets contained some measure of escalation and 9 were
coded as “Escalation” only. Here is an example of a tweet from Labour party
member Ian Lavery that contains an escalation, in addition to its main media
activity of rebuking authorities:
https://twitter.com/IanLaveryMP/status/1238569895618625536
So does this herd immunity @BorisJohnson strategy mean accepting the
end of life for many elderly & vulnerable people But others should be
fine ? Just asking for the elderly lady across the street.
This tweet was categorised as an escalation because it contains both sarcasm
and hyperbole.
Some tweets received criticisms and abuse related to a particular event
or pattern of behaviour. We have 12 examples of this in our sample. Ex-
amples of this include Dominic Cummings’ behaviour during Lockdown in
May (see section 6.2.4), the birth of Boris Johnson’s child, or Sammy Wilson’s
previous voting record on the NHS (when combined with a tweet promoting
clapping for the NHS).
Fig 6 shows the media activity category and the number of abusive replies
per category. While tweets with escalations may attract the higher percentages
of abusive replies, the most common activities getting abusive replies
are those ordinary to the job of an MP. The most common media ac-
tivities receiving replies that contain abusive language are Direct Rebuke
of Authorities (n=60) and Engaging Voters (n=47). The following quote
from Lisa Nandy (coded as a Direct Rebuke of Authorities) received 9% replies
including abusive language:
https://twitter.com/lisanandy/status/1237339808017547264
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Fig. 6 Media Activities and Replies Containing Abusive Language
It is irresponsible and short-sighted from the government to rule out
extending the post-Brexit transition period. We should be taking action
now to provide certainty for business in the face of this global economic
challenge.
This is a fairly standard argument from a member of the opposition party
who was a “Remain” voter, preferring a “soft Brexit”.25 Likewise, the following
tweet from conservative Jack Lopresti is an attempt to speak to a core group
voters and champion their interests:
https://twitter.com/JackLopresti/status/1248306181522763778
If off-licences and takeawayys are open, churches should be, Tory MP
claims https://t.co/aA2CY06XrU
This tweet was sign-posting to an article in the Telegraph in which Mr.
Lopresti makes his views known. This tweet attracted nearly 12% abusive
replies.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, all of the parties receive replies that contain abu-
sive language when they do the parts of their job that aggravate the other
parties. For example, the parties in opposition criticise the party in power,
which will defend itself. All parties attempt to reach voters. However, the
left and left-centrist parties tend to reach out to voters that conservatives do
not, such as religious minorities, migrants and People of Colour. The subject
of “virtue signalling” arises in criticisms of this type of social media activ-
ity. This is evident in the large amount of abusive replies received by Liberal
Democrats in response to their participation in Ramadan (see Section 6.2).
25 https://www.theyworkforyou.com/mp/24831/lisa nandy/wigan/votes
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As mentioned previously, virtue signalling is defined as communicating sup-
port for a specific issue with high moral value (such as fighting racism) without
providing tangible support and effort [64]. When the accusation of virtue sig-
nalling is levelled, the implicit assumption is that the gesture is empty or
amounts to “moral grandstanding” [56] without substance behind it. In this
case, in the past 10 years, evidence shows that the Muslim community has
shifted support from the Labour Party to the Liberal Democrats.26 The party
has responded to this, attempting repeatedly to elect a Muslim MP. The party
has shown some attention to the social challenges of this group, suspending a
candidate in 2019 for his comments online doubting the existence of Islama-
phobia. 27 They have also had a few gaffes, showing a lack of awareness of the
culture 28 and have still not had a Muslim MP, despite efforts. 29 Still, there
is also evidence that the gesture of fasting and donating to charity as part
of Ramadan was perceived as showing solidarity with the Muslim community
during the COVID-19 pandemic.30 Virtue signalling needs to be consid-
ered within a framework of whose attention is being courted and
whether or not that community views the attention as tokenistic or
meaningful.
7.2 COVID-19 Topics: Priorities and Leadership
Our second round of coding dealt with the COVID-19 subject referenced or
alluded to in the tweet, which we determined inductively by going through the
set of tweets using thematic analysis. We assigned tweets to one of 8 categories,
including one “non-COVID” category (n = 37), if the topic was not related to
COVID-19. These non-COVID topics include the floods that happened just
prior to the pandemic, some more general thoughts on platform issues that
are continuously relevant, such as budget and migration. Many non-COVID
related tweets were posted before COVID-19 had reached the UK to such a
significant extent. Topics include the cabinet reshuffle, class issues, Brexit, and
migration.
After COVID-19 began to take hold, those non-COVID topics shift and are
primarily related to specific issues or events, such as Jeremy Corbyn stepping
down and Keir Starmer taking lead of the Labour Party, renewed references to
a One UK policy/ One Parliament, Boris Johnson and the birth of his child,
and the Liberal Democrats celebration of Ramadan. Within the COVID-19
topics, some more specific categories, such as “fatalities” or the NHS were
26 https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/britishelection/2010/05/20105312436485579.html
27 https://metro.co.uk/2019/04/18/lib-dem-candidate-suspended-comments-muslims-
9243430/
28 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/04/26/lib-dem-councillor-apologises-
tweeting-photo-bacon-solidarity/
29 http://muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/top-stories/record-18-muslim-mps-elected-
majority-women/
30 https://www.easterneye.biz/lib-dem-mps-to-fast-during-ramadan-to-show-unity-for-
muslim-community/
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COVID-
19 Topic
No.
Tweets
Description Examples
Covid &
Brexit
10 Discussing the impact
of COVID-19 on Brexit The country cannot afford the eco-
nomic damage and chaos of a no-deal
Brexit at the end of this year. Time
is running out for the Government
to agree to an extension and peoples
livelihoods first.- Layla Moran
Health
Challenges
& Deaths
(e)
27 Discussion of and re-
porting about fatalities
during COVID-19
Italy: Population - 60m Coronavirus
cases - 21,157 Deaths - 1,441 UK:
Population - 66m Coronavirus cases -
1,372 Deaths - 35 Italy had their first
confirmed case 24hrs before the UK.
The strategy is working. - Rob Roberts
Finance %
Benefits
23 Discussion of how fi-
nancial support and
benefits will work dur-
ing COVID-19. This
includes discussion of
what COVID-19 has
shown us about our
current economic mod-
els
There’s no statutory sick pay for part-
time, low-paid or zero-hours contract
workers. And the rate of sick pay isn’t
enough to live on. Wrong at any time -
but dangerous while people who might
be ill are asked to stay home. The sys-
tem is broken and now is the time to
fix it. - Jeremy Corbyn
Opposition
Responses
9 Defense or rebuke of
Labour MPs specifi-
cally
Intentionally misleading reporting is
really disappointing at a time like this.
I’ve spoken about the opportunity for
people to get out there and help their
local communities and those in need.
Nonsense to suggest otherwise. We all
need to do our bit to get through this
crisis. - Ian Lavery
Leadership
& Commu-
nication
36 Discussion of how pol-
icy or commentary has
been delivered during
the COVID-19 crisis
The @theSNP continue to let down
thousands of homes in rural and re-
mote communities. We need an au-
dit on how they’re spending broadband
rollout money! See my exchange with
the Government - Jamie Stone
Lockdown
& Social
Distancing
28 Discussion of how lock-
down or social distanc-
ing is impacting peo-
ple, the economy and
the virus
I’m all in favour of wearing the appro-
priate face mask! @YesBikers - Stew-
art Hosie
Minorities
& Un-
dervalued
Groups
17 Any discussion about a
group that is viewed as
a minority group in the
UK
As senior Conservatives publish
Sinophobic screeds in the rw press
to distract from their own Gov-
ernments lethal complacency, its
clear racism wont stop for #Coro-
navirus. Neither must we opposing
it. Join the fightback in an hour!
http://ow.ly/4GBm30qw1jX - Bell
Ribeiro-Addy
Non-
COVID
40 Any discussion about
topics that are not
linked to Covid-19 in
direct ways, such as
flooding
A pre-dawn meal today Preparing for
my first ever fast in the holy month
of Ramadan For Muslims doing Ra-
madan in isolation, you are not alone!
#RamadanMubarak #LibDemIftar -
Ed Davey
Grand
Total
190
Table 7 COVID-19 topics that are expressed MPs’ posts on Twitter, to which the MP
received abusive replies. Descriptions and examples included.
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Fig. 7 COVID-19 Subjects and Replies Containing Abusive Language
absorbed under the main category of Health challenges and deaths to arrive at
groupings that including roughly the same number of examples from our data
sample. The full list of categories can be found at the URL provided in Section
9. In Fig 7, however, we show which topics around COVID-19 were associated
with receiving more replies that are abusive in our qualitative sample.
Leadership and Communication (n=39), along with Lockdown and Social
Distancing issues (n=28) were the COVID-19 topics that had the best rep-
resentation in the sample, with high number of replies that contain abusive
language. These two categories include issues such as perceived government
inaction and tone (Leadership and Communication), and guidance or impacts
around lockdown or social distancing, such as wearing a face mask (Lockdown
and Social Distancing).
The following tweet from Labour MP Yvette Cooper attracted more than
8% abusive replies, addressing perceived confusion around guidance from the
UK government:
https://twitter.com/YvetteCooperMP/status/1241849797155393537
I watched the Prime Ministers press conference in despair. In a public
health emergency communication and information saves lives. Yet time
& again the Government keeps failing to push out a strong clear message
to everyone. For all our sakes they urgently need to get a grip.
The following tweet from Jacob Rees-Mogg linked to an article about the
Queen isolating herself amidst COVID-19 concerns. It attracted 11% abusive
replies, mostly for invoking the name of the Queen or comparing her experience
to those of citizens who are struggling to meet their needs.
https://twitter.com/Jacob_Rees_Mogg/status/1239949070426419200
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As always an example to the nation: God save the Queen
https://t.co/N7egXeDzXD?amp=1
Discussion of Health Challenges and Deaths (n = 27) received the greatest
percentage of abusive replies. This includes conversations around UK fatalities
in comparison to other nations, support for the NHS and issues with testing.
This type of comparison, as mentioned previously (especially from someone in
a left-orientated party), is generally received as negative, and even unpatriotic
in some critiques.
Women of Colour tended to discuss topics that address the needs of mi-
norities and undervalued groups during COVID-19. White women have a pro-
file more similar to men, in which questioning leadership and communication
tended to be the COVID-19 subject for which they received more replies con-
taining abusive language. Clearly, questioning the government in power
may lead to criticism. Our literature review indicated that people tend to
want to trust authorities during a crisis. Labour politicians’ desire to keep
the subject of racism and discrimination during COVID-19 at the forefront
attracts some abusive comments for what is called “playing politics”, de-
livering “low blows” or “playing the race card” to the party in power.
Naturally, the opposition parties believe it is their job to rebuke authorities
and suggest alternative policies. Likewise, racism is not seen as a platform
issue, but a social issue that is continuously relevant. In this sense, what is
relevant to COVID-19 and should be prioritised is being negotiated in
some of this dialogue.
7.3 Contentious Issues: Disrupting the Mainstream Discourse
When we looked deeper at the controversy that might be latent in the topics
above, we identified more than 50 distinct subjects from our open coding,
and had one category of “unclear”. Some categories were related, such as
Islam and Muslims, Racism and Immigration. We reduced the categories to
5 predominant issues (see Fig 8): Home Rule/Nationalist perspectives,
Inequality and perceptions of inequality, Brexit (a continued issue with
new relevance), COVID-19 Response and Impact, and lastly, People
and Communication (which includes subjects like personal folly, tone, etc.).
Proportions of each subject to appear in tweets from different demographic
groups, as well as overall, are shown in Fig 9.
For example, the #stayalert slogan of the conservative government received
considerable criticism for being confusing and potentially working against the
goal of encouraging citizens to simply stay home. Criticising the government’s
efforts, MP Ian Blackford tweeted:
https://twitter.com/Ianblackford_MP/status/1259250871814295552
“#stayalert. What kind of buffoon thinks of this kind of nonsense. It
is an invisible threat. Staying alert is not the answer #StayHomeSave-
Lives is.”
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Fig. 8 Contentious Issues and Replies Containing Abusive Language
Fig. 9 The 190 highly abused tweets in the qualitative sample, split by topic and by de-
mographic. ”WW” means white women, ”WoC” means women of colour, and similarly for
men.
This tweet received both a number of abusive replies to Mr. Blackford for
critising the government’s attempts to resolve complex challenges during the
pandemic, and a number of supportive replies (some of which are also abusive
toward the government and certain ministers). This polarisation indicates a
liminal hotspot around trusting and critiquing authorities in crisis.
In terms of party insights, the Liberal Democrats received a considerable
amount of attention for speaking about Ramadan and the Muslim community
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Controversial
Topic
No.
Tweets
Description Examples
People & Com-
munication
Style
47 Tweets about specific
people and their ac-
tions or the way that
they communicate.
Dom Cummings followed the
guidelines and looked after his
family. End of story.- Oliver
Dowden
Covid Re-
sponse &
Impact
67 Tweets about the
COVID-19 pandemic
and any responses or
impacts
Latest NHS advice: If you have:
a new continuous cough OR a
high temperature You should
stay at home for seven days.
Read the full guidance now:
http://NHS.uk/coronavirus -
Boris Johnson
Inequality 45 Tweets about inequal-
ity in any form, be
it racial, gender spe-
cific, religious, class-
based, etc.
Amazing. Dave telling it like it is.
- John McDonnell
Brexit 14 Tweets about Brexit Good to hear EU Commission say-
ing they are fine with an Australia
style deal or a bespoke Free Trade
Agreement. So let’s get on with it.
No need to argue over it all year. -
John Redwood
Home Rule &
Nationalism
17 Tweets that appear to
address long-standing
conflicts about the
Union and its Gov-
ernance, including
pro-Scotland and
anti-SNP sentiment.
Really the most politically frustrat-
ing aspect of this crisis is not hav-
ing an independent Scotland to do
the emergency guaranteed income,
to do the testing - to take a dif-
ferent path. We are instead shack-
led to inept economic extremists at
Westminster. - Angus MacNeil
Grand Total 190
Table 8 Controversial topics that are expressed MPs’ posts on Twitter, to which the MP
received abusive replies. Descriptions and examples included.
(56% of their sample). The SNP, as one might expect, gathers some abu-
sive replies when tweeting support for Scottish independence or for promoting
Scottish excellence. Hannah Bardell received abusive and critical replies for
posting the following tweet:
https://twitter.com/HannahB4LiviMP/status/1238750253182050310
Once again the PM following Nicola Sturgeons lead
The tweet was accompanied by an article from the Guardian31 about the
Prime Minister’s decision to ban mass gatherings.
Angus MacNeil was called “divisive” and “divisionist” for the following
tweet in response to clapping for the NHS:
It is ”NHS Scotland”
31 https://twitter.com/guardiannews/status/1238591827449651205/photo/1
Vindication, Virtue and Vitriol 35
Likewise, making statements in favour of uniting the four UK countries, or
making light of those countries’ prerogative to handle the pandemic differently,
attracts strong criticism and abuse. For example, Stephan Crabb received
several abusive replies for the following tweet:
Quite the change in rhetoric from the days when Welsh Government
were encouraging people to come to Wales and drive their 4x4’s right
onto the beaches.
Another liminal hotspot is around who is expected to speak about social is-
sues of injustice, which commonly attract abusive responses. Women of Colour
were speaking mostly about inequality when they received replies containing
abuse (10 Tweets, which is 66% of our sample of Women of Colour, and 5%
of our total sample). Men of Colour more closely resembled the subject at-
tention of both White women and White men on the more general discussion
of COVID-19 response and leadership through the crisis (For all men, issues
with Leadership, or COVID-19 response made up 60% of all topics; for white
women, more than 70%. 10% of the topics discussed by men in their sample are
about controversial people specifically, such as Boris Johnson, Jeremy Corbyn
and Dominic Cummings).
8 Discussion and Future Work
All activity online can be viewed as communication and persuasion - there are
people on different sides of different issues, vying for the public attention. This
can attract positive and negative responses. However, overall, what our inves-
tigation has shown us is that dimensions of political discourse are mediated
by perceptions of power, potentially due to the uncertain situation created by
COVID-19. In the sections below, we summarise our findings about the influ-
ence of ideology, political authority and affect on how the words of MPs are
communicated and interpreted by the public during the COVID-19 pandemic.
8.0.1 Power, Ideology and Virtue
When parties on the left speak directly with and from undervalued communi-
ties or voters, this may be perceived as virtue signalling by the right. When
a party is not in power, this is even more difficult to communicate. However,
when the party in power shows a lack of tact toward excluded communities,
this is also judged more harshly.
When the party in power communicates policy about controversial issues
in the name of the people, it will get push-back from people who did not vote
for that party. When the left attempts to meet voters by discussing issues
(racism, migration) that a portion of the public may feel are external to rel-
evant British politics right now (COVID-19 and Brexit), they will get abuse.
However, for the left, those are topics that exist everywhere all the time and
are systemic. Looking at successful interventions by opposition parties in the
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government’s activities may constitute an interesting area for future research.
More specifically, this research could help to answer questions about the origins
of priorities and disagreements.
8.0.2 Power, Authority and Vindication
What the answers to our three research questions indicate is that it matters
who is “in charge”, when looking at how the public and other ministers
respond to the social media activities of UK MPs during COVID-19. The
party in power (along with its members) will have more responsibility to the
public for mastering tone and explaining their actions. Opposition parties will
have more difficulty in a health crisis to not be perceived as unnecessarily
antagonistic. In addition, we found that it matters who a person is and what
they represent, whether or not an individual will be perceived as a
trustworthy authority. Many tweets in our sample appeared to be speaking
to core groups of voters and other parliamentarians. They are not necessarily
an invitation for debate.
8.0.3 Power, Affect and Vitriol
In terms of affect, our data shows that it matters what you say and how you
say it, particularly in connection with priors. If Jeremy Corbyn posts about
racism, and has been continuously in the news for not handling antisemitism
in his party, he will get some angry replies. If Sammy Wilson voted against a
pay-rise for nurses in 2017, and then posts a “clap for carers” post on Twitter,
those who remember his prior voting record will be angry. The more affected
a tweet is, the more this appears to aggravate.
Vitriol as a result of one’s previous political statements or actions is one
side of the story. Hate is another. The issue of what is abusive versus what
is hate speech needs to be disentangled from both abuse and from racism.
Racism does not only involve hate speech. It also involves a) expecting People
of Colour to champion racial equality, as the breakdown of topics indicates and
b) framing racism as a fringe issue. This is evidenced in our dataset. Abuse,
though uncomfortable and uncivil, is a different type of speech whose study
may be useful for any number of discussions, potentially on the subject of ago-
nism or counter-speech. Agonism argues that the contestations of the time can
be used to renew democracy and strengthen public discourse [40]. Promising
work on recognising an highlighting counter-speech in online communication
is already on the horizon [11,42].
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored how UK MPs contribute to the information and
communication environment during COVID-19, and the abusive replies that
they receive. Contextualising these activities in terms of what the public expect
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during a health crisis, how ministers typically use social media to communicate
in crisis, and which mitigating features of either the person or context interfere
in those activities, we were able to advance the conversation about online abuse
toward some new directions, such as how to understand virtue signalling or
what it means to play party politics. Building on previous studies of abusive
language toward British MPs, we offered a large-scale, mixed-methods study
of abusive and antagonistic responses to UK politicians during the COVID-19
pandemic from early February to late May 2020. We found that - similarly
to other key moments in British contemporary politics - political ideology,
authority and affect have played a role in how MPs social media posts were
received by the public. In the context of COVID-19, we found that pressing
subjects, like financial support or unemployment, may attract high levels of
engagement, but do not necessarily lead to abusive dialogue. As with earlier
findings, prominence and event surges impact the amount of abusive replies
MPs received. In addition, the topic of the tweet (in particular if it is divisive)
and the individual bringing that topic into discussion (their gender, ethnicity
or party, for example) impacted levels of abuse. Women of Colour appear to
bring the topic of inequality to the table and this attracts a variety of abuse.
Other MPs may be discussing inequality and not receiving abuse (which this
work did not cover).
In conclusion, this work contributes to the wider understanding of abusive
language online, in particular that which is directed at public officials. Issues
of power, which are crystallised in terms of political power or social power
impact communication at all stages.
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